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In their proposal for a manuscript based on the proceedings of the 1990 conference on "Politics, Ideology, and Literary Discourse in Modern China," the organizers stressed that "it is high time to engage in a comprehensive reexamination of modern Chinese literature, not only in terms of its local political and ideological traditions and determinations, but also against the larger background of the world historical experience of modernity." There is implicit in this call a sense that a true interrogation of modern Chinese literature from the perspective of what must perhaps be called "world literature" has never been undertaken. One's first reaction is to wonder how this can be true, given that the American sinological establishment has published such substantial amounts of material on modern Chinese literature. But perhaps the notion of the modern that is advanced here contains depths that may explain the sense that modern Chinese literature has been a site largely protected from the harsher inquiry that rigorous comparative study would surely bring to bear.
A clue to the reticence in this respect can perhaps be detected in Naoki Sakai's summary of the scholar Takeuchi Yoshimi's-known in sinology as the preeminent Japanese scholar of Lu Xun-version of the modern: "Modernity for the Orient ... is primarily its subjugation to the West's political, military, and economic control. The modern Orient was born only when it was invaded, defeated, and ex-ploited by the West. This is to say that only when the Orient became an object for the West did it enter modern times. The truth of modernity for the non-West, therefore, is its reaction to the West."l The disadvantageous position of the non-West in this scheme was initially explored by Edward Said in Orientalism, and the set of issues surrounding the advent of Western discourses in the rest of the world has since, under the various rubrics of "postcolonial" and "subaltern" studies, gone on to become the fulcrum of one of the most important movements in contemporary criticism. 2 Students of the Chinese humanities have, however, been curiously passive, if not, until very recently, largely silent on this issue. I will attempt to focus on some of the possible reasons for this silence, first by suggesting historical reasons why certain key issues in Chinese literary studies have rarely been pursued or are pursued in ways that dismay many observers. I attempt to address what it is that these long-enduring encumbrances try to displace, with special attention to the position of literary realism in Chinese literature and literary criticism.
It is probably safe to say that as of about 1980 the study of modern Chinese literature in the West was more interesting (Le., it had more compelling things to say to noninsiders) than the study of modern Japanese literature. And I think that those of us in the field took compensatory pride in that fact; it was but one of the things that helped to demonstrate to usthat our being out of the mainstream of literary theory was more a question of the West's lack of interest in the non-West than a defect in the way we went about our work. C. T. Hsia and Jaroslav Prusek, for example, dealt with literary issues that went beyond the appeal of particular works or the fondness for particular, hyperaestheticized critical response that seemed to characterize American scholarship on Japanese literature at the time. The last ten years, however, have not been good to scholars of modern Chinese literature, and we now find ourselves, much like Ah Q, daily having our heads banged against the wall by the same Japanese Xiao D we were once so contemptuous of. 3 What has happened here? I would suggest that in the intervening period a new generation of students of Japanese literature has radically historicized the nature of the discourse in that field and thereby forced it onto the broader stage of "world literary studies" (not without resistance from the Europeanists who invented that field and have always dominated it). Specifically, these scholars have begun to focus on the issue of the problematics of the Japanese response to the West (that same old chestnut that has long-since been deemed unfashionable within Chinese studies). 4 In particular, this new generation of scholars has come to scrutinize the issue of Japan's sense of itself and its otherness from the West and to assess some of the more material consequences of cultural nationalism. Under these premises, hard looks have been given to a variety of written work that reveals itself to be in play between acceptance of Western modes of discourse on the one hand and the displacement of those modes in the name of a return to some essential Japaneseness on the other. The question of the import of the encounter with the West, then, has been transformed. From the sterile pursuit of one-way influence studies, the issue has been reformulated into a series of dynamic interactions within Japanese literary discourse itself. Thus arises the apparent paradox that only through questions raised by the most historically specific features of modern Japanese literary discourse has the field been permitted to raise issues of theoretical interest to those outside the narrow range of professional concern. 5 We cannot expect to find exactly the same configuration of questions confronting modern Chinese literature. There has, however, since the death of Joseph Levenson in 1969 been a curious and very marked silence concerning the traumatic choices that the coming of the West presented to China. This silence is striking in that modern Chinese literature has traditionally dated itself as beginning in a movement to discard the native literary language in favor of a literary language explicitly based on Western models. It should be even more striking in that, up to about 1917, the literary language was one of the few elements of the tradition not regarded as discredited by conspicuous failure to turn back the challenge presented by Western imperialism. Or, at least, through the late Qing, the old literary language had come to be regarded as the seat of the "national essence," a cultural domain that guaranteed the essential difference of China from the universalizing demands of the modern West. 6 Perhaps it was the cataclysm of the Cultural Revolution that put the question into abeyance. For, after all, the one premise that made Levenson's project antiseptic enough to pursue was his secure assumption that Chinese culture as traditionally defined had expired (or had been killed off; that the distinction did not seem particularly significant to him was characteristic of the time in which he wroteIdeologies of Realism in Modern China the 1950s) sometime soon after 1895. Perhaps one of the few assertions about the Cultural Revolution that would brook no dissent is that one of its key features was Mao's obsession in the years after 1965 with just how untrue this assumption was. Moreover, Mao's evidently steadfast (and apparently paradoxical) determination to punish both those who claimed the old culture had been supplanted by something new and those who insisted on finding its traces everywhere in contemporary life added an immense charge to this already highly overdetermined issue. Thus it was thought that probing too deeply into the ideological dimensions of the interaction between China and the West would not only be futile but would lead to the most acute sorts of ideological pain.
I suggest that the question of China's reaction to the West will press upon us with an intensity in direct proportion to the extent to which we try to repress it. The coming of literary ideas from the West is a vast topic; a variety of literary schools advocated different genres at different times. Many of these schools shared a determination to minimize the difficulties involved in the absorption or naturalization of Western literary ideas into a Chinese context. Such difficulties as there were were generally attributed to flaws in Chinese literary culture itself. Problems of accommodation were rarely ascribed to any sense that Western ideas-whether realism, romanticism, Marxism, or modernism-had any inherent contradictions either in themselves or in their theoretical suitability to the Chinese context. This pattern is notably characteristic of the May Fourth period, that short span of years in the late 1910s and early 1920s marked by the inclination to accept Western ideas uncritically. In fact, the discourse on Western literary theory in the May Fourth period is remarkably consistent in making the assumption that such ideas as realism, romanticism, and "neo-romanticism" were universally valid and that any slippage between theory and practice was owed exclusively to factors unique to China.
This attitude toward literary ideas was not unique within the overall structure of May Fourth thought. Ideas about literature were but an important subset of a general discourse on bringing modern, universally valid ideas to China as the general remedy to a backwardness that, if not attended to, would eventually lead to the dissolution of the Chinese polity. In this formulation, the concept of the modern was indistinguishable from the "Western," and it functioned as the major premise lying behind such subsidiary intellectual formula-tions as democracy, science, self-liberation, and revolution. Literature was regarded primarily as the vehicle by which one or more of these new and liberating ideas would be brought to China. This constellation of modern ideas served as the governing concept for two separate impulses. On the one hand, it encapsulated all aspirations to overcome those elements of the past-and by the May Fourth period these elements had come to be seen as virtually the total set of things traditional-that were perceived as standing in the way of China's universalizing itself in the company of nations. On the other hand, the modern embodied a discourse of national salvation, or, more specifically, a means of salvaging some sense in which China could maintain a specific identity in the face of this same process of a universalizing modernization.
These two formulations were conjoined by modern Chinese writers as if they were two steps of the same process: the abolition of traditional evils, followed by the construction of new and "modern" social and intellectual entities. But what is hidden in this formulation is that both steps are part of a complex of responses to an unprecedented challenge to Chinese thought-the revelation that indigenous institutions and ideas were not capable of keeping the state together in the face of Western incursion. To make a long story short, the second step in the process-building modern institutions capable of keeping China viable-was, in effect, intended to negate the critical impact of the first step-the invalidation of the traditional system. For the very concept of maintaining the preeminence of the Chinese political order lay at the heart of the traditional ideology that had by May Fourth come to be seen as the totalizing force that made social, political, and intellectual progress impossible.? In other words, the motivation for trying to resituate China in a new and universal framework paradoxically arose out of a reflex that sought to obliterate the conditions that had necessitated a call for universalism in the first place. 8 Chinese intellectuals might have dealt with this impasse by claiming that both China and the West had embarked on a simultaneous excursion into a new and modern world, which, for China at least, was marked by its critical position toward all historical formations in both China and the West. As Levenson pointed out long ago, Marxism embodied just such an ideology. More to the point for literary studies, the concept of "modernity" opened the way toward an even more radical critique of all that had gone before. In considering the appeal Ideologies of Realism in Modern China of Marxism, however, it should be remembered that the predecessor to Marxism as a total explanatory scheme from the West was the concept of evolution, which was envisioned as a universal discourse capable of demonstrating how the world's particulars were actually part of a historical movement that was pulling in a single direction. 9 The problem with positing such an all-embracing scheme was that the historical particulars embedded within it kept proliferating and precipitating out of each carefully formulated solution. For Chinese critics of the late Qing who looked at the Western novel as the end of a universal teleological process, for example, the differences in linguistic practices between China and the West were evident from the start. In fact, the harder critics tried to show the universal features of narrative language, the more the differences in Chinese practice forced themselves to the fore. The ineradicable fact of Lin Shu's wenyon translations of the staples of the English narrative canon, for instance, should have served as an abrupt reminder to the utopian critics of the late Qing who saw vernacular fiction as a ready way to tap into the mainstream of modern life that the particulars of the Chinese tradition were going to complicate the process of universalization. To cite another example, in later years the "realism" that was envisioned as being such a commonsensical category kept escaping from its ostensibly evident definition and revealing subsets that complicated even the most abstract realization of the ideal. Quite aside from the global misunderstanding on the part of Chinese May Fourth writers of the context in which realism had functioned in the West, described so brilliantly by Marston Anderson in The Limits of Realism,10 the eventual permutations-critical realism, socialist realism, proletarian realism, and romantic realism-taken as a whole serve to discount the notion that realism could ever have constituted a discursive category stable enough to provide a source of positive intellectual guidance.
Historical contingency thus intervened with each attribute set forth as an instance of the master narrative of evolution. At each point where anyone tried to attach the evolutionary universal to cultural praxis, particulars from the Chinese past asserted themselves and demonstrated a critical difference. And as each new facet of historical contingency interposed itself between practical experience and the vision of a perfect process of evolution, Chinese intellectuals were reminded of how the "universal" discourse they were conditioned to seek was in fact a cultural artifact of precisely the alien culture that had nullified an earlier unuttered-but all the more powerful precisely because of that silence-assumption that Chinese culture was universal in itself. In the post-Confucian world of modern China, any attempt to recuperate the condition of universal validity that had been assumed under the empire brought sharp reminders of how irretrievable that prior condition of unquestioned universality had become.
Faced with this impasse, post-May Fourth writers overwhelmingly chose not to question the assumption that universal validity was possible. Rather, any anxiety about the possibility of the extension of literary universals to China was displaced into global condemnation of the particular features of Chinese literary practice and history. These features were seen as the devastating impediment to the implementation of universals, which were, after all, imports from the West. Critics and writers thus created for themselves an intellectual framework in which the native product was always at fault for not living up to a new and transcendent ideal. The unfair treatment of traditional literature by modern critics that resulted is well known. What has not been examined, however, are the consequences this ideology of rejection toward all indigenous products, both past and future, was to have on the development of modern Chinese literature.
The contradictions embodied in May Fourth attempts to establish literary universals at the expense of specific features of Chinese literary practice can be seen clearly in the discourse on realism that was a dominant motif of literary criticism in those years. Although realism was the dominant choice for the entry of the "modern" into Chinese literary discourse, from the beginning a few of those who introduced it confessed to serious reservations about the concept. Rarely did these reservations, however, concern whether a literary genre acknowledged to have been developed abroad might have features rendering it unsuitable to Chinese conditions. Instead, they emerged from the opposite perspective, centering on the notion that the Chinese literary tradition had ill-prepared the ground for the introduction of something that has a clearly established and global validity.ll There were two principal reasons that realism (or naturalism, a word seen more often, but used in such a way that it appears to be virtually indistinguishable from realism) took pride of place among literary ideas during the time of the May Fourth movement.
12 Both of these reasons were initially part of a general May Fourth reformist discourse and thus were not originally advanced by specialists with literary matters at the forefront of their concern. First, realism was discovered to lie near the top of a Western evolutionary scheme of the progression of genres. Realism was in this sense seen as the natural successor to classicism and romanticism, two genres that Chinese critics saw as variously dominating the long history of Chinese literature. Realism thus became a token of faith that Chinese literature was moving forward along the universal path pioneered by Western literary practice.
The second factor enhancing the appeal of realism was its identification with movements for social reform that had characterized nineteenth century Europe. In a China desperately seeking ways to elevate itself out of social and political backwardness, the literary form most identified with reform movements in the West was hard to resist. That Japan had earlier introduced literary realism and had gone on to prosper as a modern state added significantly to realism's appeal. In fact, this reformist aspect of Western literature had been a powerful draw long before the May Fourth movement, having been noticed with approval even before 1900. 13 When literary specialists considered realism, they took their bearings from and generally tried to work within the assumptions framing the larger evolutionary and social discourse, even if their discussion of the details tended to be more specific and nuanced. The critic Shen Yanbing , better known as Mao Dun, the pen name he adopted after 1928, was perhaps more than anyone else responsible for the elaboration of the theory of realism in China. Mao Dun, like most everyone else, accepted the orthodox premises on which realism is based, but his ideas reveal a highly complicated relationship with the concept. His decision to opt for naturalism-the term he used most often-instead of some other "universal" genre grew out of a negative evaluation of Chinese literature rather than from a wholehearted commitment to the aesthetic particulars of the form itself. 14 In accepting the principle that naturalism closely "reflects"-he used the English word at one point-society as it actually is,15 he saw the genre primarily as powerfully distinct from an old Chinese literature written by authors only concerned with self-expression and completely deficient in the capacity to objectively analyze and describe. 16 But even as Mao Dun saw the need for an augmented capacity for describing reality, he conceded the power of arguments against a purely objective realism. In late 1920 he even advocated a "neoromanticism" to compensate for the overly mechanistic side of realism or naturalism:
If one values only analytic expression, then if it is not biased toward the good, it will certainly be biased toward the bad. Romantic writing and naturalistic writing each go to one of these extremes. Descriptions of ugliness do, of course, have artistic value, but they only represent one side of life and they cannot in the end be considered as faultless and faithful expression. The works of Western postrealist neoromanticism are able to combine both observation and imagination, and the resulting synthesis gives expression to life. 17 Given his acceptance of the universality of evolutionary schemes, Mao Dun's awareness that realism had been supplanted in the West as the mainstream of literary creativity would have been enough to give him pause about its applicability to China. 18 Thus, even in the long essay he published in July 1922 that seems to have been designed as the final and unequivocal embrace of naturalism that he had been unable to give eighteen months earlier, he still spends considerable time acknowledging the force of objections to the form. He sets out six arguments against realism that he has found to be current in Chinese literary circles, four of which are centered on its "mechanistic materialism." Mao Dun considered this materialism to stifle literature within the confines of a rigid objectivity, precluding the application of the kind of subjective energy that would allow literature to escape the confines of either traditional rules or of a passive attitude toward the possibility of individual agents gaining leverage on their own lives.
By mid-1922, however, Mao Dun appears to have finally decided that the disadvantages of realism were no longer significant enough to require a literary ideology that combined the objectivity of realism and the subjectivity of romanticism. One possible reason for this change may have been his immersion into Marxism in the intervening period. 19 But in Mao Dun's writings from this time, one can perceive a reason that may antecede both his turn to Marxism and his conversion to the ideology of realism: His writings of 1921 and 1922 are permeated with an awareness of and dismay concerning an overwhelming subjectivity in traditional Chinese letters vastly more Ideologies of Realism in Modern China threatening to the future of Chinese writing than the drawbacks of mechanistic materialism.
Exasperation with a subjectivity that inhibits the writer from gaining a comprehensive fix on reality runs through most of Mao Dun's writings from this period. Perhaps his most detailed explanation of the defect occurs in "The Relationship of People to Literature and the Traditional Misperception of the Status of the Writer in China" from early 1921: "[Literature] that belongs only to the occasional [efforts] of a single self and a single period can, in fact, be good and beautiful. But it can only be the literature of the author himself; it cannot be a literature of a period and even less that of a nation. Historically, most of our literature has this flaw." To counter this defect, he goes on to proclaim that "literature that belongs to [one] person's (Le., the author's) conceptualization is behind us. Literature is not an author's subjective property, it is not one person's, it is not for amusement when one is happy or for diversion when one is disappointed. Quite the contrary, people belong to literature [rather than literature to any individual person]."20 Again, Mao Dun acknowledges the argument noted in "Naturalism and Modern Chinese Fiction" that the stifling environment brought to traditional Chinese literature by the Neo-Confucian precept "literature should convey the daD" (wen yi zai dao) could only be countered by the powerful feelings residing in literary romanticism. He rebuts this argument, however, by asserting that "I think that Chinese literature is not completely without strong feelings. Are not the 'novels of complaint' full of strong feelings?21 However, it is just because subjective feelings of anger are too strong in them that their [literary] effect is so unexpectedly poor" (p. 398). In other words, a subjectivity that has long haunted Chinese literature and that Mao Dun senses as a continued danger emerges as the core argument pushing him from his earlier advocacy of neoromanticism toward endorsement of naturalism. His anxiety overpowers the two factors that had earlier motivated the move beyond realism: the evolutionary argument that realism had been supplanted in the West and his earlier belief that the mechanistic pessimism of naturalism required an injection of subjective feelings.
As Rene Wellek makes clear in his important essay "The Concept of Realism in Literary Scholarship" the discourse on realism in the West is replete with concern over the dangers represented by the interference of the personal voice:
"Objectivity" is certainly the other main watchword of realism. Objectivity means again something negative, a distrust of subjectivism, of the romantic exaltation of the ego: in practice often a rejection of lyricism, of the personal mood. In poetry the Parnassians wanted and achieved impassibilite, and in fiction the main technical demand of realist theory came to be impersonality, the complete absence of the author from his work, the suppression of any interference by the author. The theory had its main spokesman in Flaubert but it was also the preoccupation of Henry James.
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When Mao Dun came to argue a remarkably similar point, however, he made no such appeal to a common realist heritage. Ironically, the universal terms that the Chinese critic had emphasized elsewhere were readily available. The same critique of the excesses of the subjective voice that Mao Dun frames for China existed in the West. Given the general sophistication of his discussion of the history and features of literary terms and the added weight attributed to Western precedents in the May Fourth era, it seems a bit unreasonable to accuse him of ignorance on this score. Yet Mao Dun for some reason casts his argument-and, it should be stressed, it is one that he deems at once key to his case and of the greatest difficulty (if we are to count the number of times it crops up as an objection to realism)-exclusively in terms of the paralyzing defects of Chinese literary discourse rather than looking to features common to all literatures. In developing this critique, then-no matter how carefully he has anatomized the literary features of naturalism at other points in his text-the particulars of the Chinese case seem to overwhelm any efforts at keeping the argument on a more general plane. Thus although the attractions of realism have all the qualities needed to constitute a "concrete universal"-something valid in both the general and the specific cases-Mao Dun's fomulation of realism breaks down in the end to something unique to China. And so it was to be for realism thereafter. Sensitivity to the personal voice and its social and political implications was to put a rhetorical spin on the concept in the following decades. In this way the realism imported so hopefully after 1918 would become less a site of speculation about the inherent powers that had been its initial source of appeal. It became instead driven by an intensifying anxiety over why local conditions in China prevented the hopes for it from being realized.
The resulting contrast between the hope Chinese critics came to invest in realism and the extraordinary negativity with which these Ideologies of Realism in Modern China same critics in post-May Fourth China addressed their own literary tradition allowed them to view literature as a space for things absolutely new. The contrast between new universal and old particulars allowed the former to be invested at will with utopian prospects, while the latter became the home of all literary negatives. By leaving the old behind, in other words, anything became possible. It is thus easy to understand how members of the New Culture Movement after 1919, whether they espoused naturalism, romanticism, or neoromanticism, shared a common and rather extravagant vision of what literature could create for China. Less obvious is the possibility that the realists, in seeking to harness individual vision within a framework of social transformation, were the most radical of all the literary schools in laying the groundwork for a thoroughgoing utopian vision that literature could depict. The strong personal voice of the Creation Society's Guo Moruo and his vision of social melioration, for example, had been on the realist agenda from the beginning.
May Fourth critics in their zeal to turn to the new became trapped in a particularly acute set of contradictions when it came to the evaluation of premodern Chinese narrative. On the one hand, they urgently required China to have a tradition of the novel so as to fit May Fourth narrative work into an evolutionary progression. On the other hand, the clear lack of fit between the old vernacular fiction and the historical record of the Western, "universal" novel set up opposing pressures to deny the Chinese genre any validity as part of a live tradition to build on in the twentieth century. The result is a curious critical posture in which the novel is simultaneously praised as an historical artifact and damned in most of its particular manifestations as an unhealthy influence on the present.
23 It becomes, therefore, virtually impossible to decide what theoretical conception of the traditional novel modern Chinese writers worked from when they set about the difficult task of trying to erect something new. Perhaps the exigencies of national emergency and the consequent attraction of Western ideas were simply too great to allow much speculation about the basic ideas lying behind the genre they were trying so hard to reject. Some conjecture about what the differences between the underlying principles of traditional Chinese and Western narrative, however, no matter how repressed or dimly perceived by the participants in the discourse, seems necessary to flesh out the facile rejection of May Fourth critics.
The conclusions of Andrew Plaks concerning allegory in the tra-ditional Chinese novel are suggestive in this regard. In analyzing the different conceptions of allegory in China and Europe, Plaks wrote: "Each isolated element of the Chinese allegory, by virtue of the existential process of ebb and flow in which it is caught up, 'stands for,' or 'partakes of,' the sum total of all existence that remains invisible only in its extent, and not in essence." 24 Mao Dun's objections concerning traditional Chinese narrative's inability to do anything but keep "accounts" of phenomena may be a way of saying much the same thing. 25 In Mao Dun's view, Chinese fiction records things that are "invisible only in [their] extent" or things in a static mode in which the direction of any motion is always already assumed and thus, depressingly, always already known in advance. In other words, according to the Chinese critic, traditional fiction was restricted to setting forth things that were already fixed within a preexisting intellectual horizon. Seeing in Western narrative the power to create things that were truly invisible before they were written into existence, then, became a profound and utopian source of liberation from the dreary inertia that May Fourth saw as perhaps the principal feature of the Chinese past.
The core of this utopianism was a notion of representation that the critics agreed had not been accessible to traditional writers. This augmented conception of representation occupied the ground between two poles, the one being the potential for bringing individual vision to life-the very thing that Mao Dun had finally come out so strongly against-and the other being the potential for literature to create a clean and objective view of a society in transformation. Each pole also expressed a highly complicated notion of the contribution to be made by the individual voice, from something that had to be fostered to something that had to be most tightly reined in. And realism was conceived as something that could provide the perfect fusion between the two poles, as a power that could bring into being things that had never existed before in literature. And the implication was always-such were the terms of the deal, after all-that this literary existence anticipated existence in real life as well.
May Fourth hopes for representation make even more sense in view of the historical junction of their occurrence. The one point on which virtually all facets of the movement were in agreement was that May Fourth embodied the final realization that neither the conventions of the tradition nor its ideological explanations made sense any longer. The seductive properties of theories of representation Ideologies of Realism in Modern China become evident. At the precise moment that the immanent world ceased to offer any hope of making sense, a way presented itself of imparting meaning to this new opacity: representationalism, or the assumption that some new and meaningful order could be conferred upon the myriad phenomena found at all levels of life. The possibility of thus imagining something into existence was the precise analog to the social crisis that Chinese radicals were facing in the years around 1919: an old and familiar order had suddenly revealed itself to be a set of empty signifiers, and a novel vision was urgently required to create a new order of meaning.
Understanding that realism implied a capacity for literary representation that Chinese critics saw as unprecedented in Chinese letters should help to clarify the vast appeal of literature to May Fourth reformers. When assumptions about the efficacy of realism were set in the context of traditional ideas of the productivity of writingperhaps given their ultimate persuasiveness by the vivid memory of the examination system and highly influential debates about the nature and function of writing that began in the late eighteenth century-their appeal seemed to carry with it an almost inevitable link to social practice.
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The very ease and plasticity of fictionality as introduced into China in the twentieth century carried with it the seeds of a powerful anxiety that even demonizing traditional literature could not wholly suppress. If fictional realism were so universally efficacious, what was the meaning of its absence from the long duration of Chinese literary history? And if it had been absent for so long, what was to guarantee that it could be successfully imported now? If anxiety about writing's fidelity to the world is a feature of all notions of representation, the form this anxiety took in May Fourth China was of a special kind. As I have tried to demonstrate, it becomes a perpetual concern as to whether a literary ideal can be transplanted onto stony Chinese soil. As such, it would seldom lead in the direction of questioning the means of representation themselves, but rather would be displaced into constant apprehension as to whether or not the individual writer could transcend his or her own tradition sufficiently to be faithful to the terms of the new norm. It was precisely this fear that traditional dispositions regarding writing would recrudesce that caused those who advocated realism to be on guard, principally against the danger of that solipsism that seemed to many critics the most enduring legacy of the Chinese literary tradition.
We thus return to the gap between the local effects of the embrace of a theory of representation and the exalted universal goals that provided the master narrative of its adoption into China. Inasmuch as this was to remain a fault line around which much of the particular texture of modern Chinese literary history formed itself, a closer look at some of the detail produced at this site should shed a unique light on some of the practices and results of post-May Fourth Chinese literature. In looking at those literary practices that most evidently clash with the theory that realism has transcendent validity, it should be possible to get a picture of some of the discursive displacements brought about by the failure to match theory to practice.
The idea that one can fabricate something radically other than the means of fabrication themselves has consequences far beyond the local province of literary texts-political implications, in particular. In looking at the relationship of literature and politics from this perspective, one does not dictate to the other, but rather they share an ideal of the powers of representation to bring imagined worlds into existence. This shared ideal also guarantees a perpetual series of encounters and mutual interventions between the two spheres-after all, they both have their eye on the same discursive space. This enduring symbiosis, the predominant link between politics and literature in modern China, has long been overshadowed by concern with the question of how politics has dominated literary discourse. It is as easy to see Marxism, with its narrative of an inevitable coming into being of the imagined, as the culmination of the contradictory hopes embraced by realism as it is to see any of the various offshoots of realism as the result of the embrace of Marxism by the literary world. A hard look at the history of Chinese realism thus should cause us to reexamine our conventional assumptions about cause and effect. Furthermore, many of the most convincing accounts of the genesis of modernism in the West are based on a notion of a crisis of the bourgeoisie, a social class that China was never to have. The aesthetic ideals contained within representationalism, never envisioned as compronlised by having become the ideology of state power, were to remain as perpetual goad to a literary imagination mired in the horrible reality of twentieth-century China. As I will attempt to explain below, this ideal remained even when a persistent social conscience obliged writers to rule out of bounds the more utopian elements of the formulation.
A criticism of modern Chinese literature based on Western no-tions of representation is considerably more than half right. C. T. Hsia, in A History of Modern Chinese Fiction, asks questions concerning the representational adequacy of the texts he examines that their authors are begging to be asked. The argument that he is applying an alien standard to Chinese literature cannot apply in a context in which writer and critic alike are doing their best to pursue modes of writing taken straight from the Western canon. But Hsia's deteflnination to pursue issues of successful representation is indicative of the key issues facing modern Chinese letters in an even more important way. His assumption that literary realism is a transhistorical universal mirrors the moves made by its initial advocates within China to mask the crisis in intellectual life brought about by the adoption of a theory of literary discourse so clearly sensed to be of alien origin. Hsia's almost reflexive findings that Chinese realislll is inferior to the real thing mirrors May Fourth frustration in discovering the pitfalls lying in the path of successful adaptation.
In that representation seemed to hold out the possibility of sornething for nothing, it was in itself the perfect image (or device) of the hope that it held out. But given that it was a new graft, adoption of this idea entailed as well a powerful sense of guilt. In other words, how could serious intellectuals accept this utopian vision, this vast justification for the notion of creating something from nothing, without at least entertaining the idea that it just might all be a massive fraud, particularly in light of its foreign origin? Indeed, the term realism itself neatly obscures the core of representationalism's appeal even as it masks its problematic aspects. By being able to label the representation of things that had yet to come into being as faithful transcriptions of reality, Chinese critics of the May Fourth era could both have their cake and eat it. They could indulge utopian possibilities while claiming the most rigorous discipline in recording the real world. However, this very utopianism insured a perpetual series of crises. If the theory of representation embodied the most extravagant of hopes of social amelioration, the texts actually produced under its aegis were bound by realism's most basic tenets to do at least some justice to the dismal actualities of modern Chinese life. Works of literary realism were thus always doomed to provide the plainest illustrations of how remote utopian fantasies were from any hope of practical realization. The eventual adherence of writers to the stark methods of a Marxist-inspired critical realism guaranteed the persistence of a sharp division between theory and practice that came to be a longstanding rebuke to the unfulfilled hopes of critic and author alike.
Lu Xun's early story (completed in January 1921) "Guxiang" (My old home) offers profound meditations on the circumstances of the personal voice in the modern story. The story is a simple account of a journey back home to dispose of the old family mansion by a highly educated man from a family that once occupied the top rungs of the local social ladder. After having been away for about twenty years, the narrator presents an account of his return that is constantly interrupted and complicated by several almost involuntary reminiscences about happier childhood times. Ironically, these recollections center on visions of a boy from a poor peasant family he had once known rather than on memories of wealth and power. These visions contrast so powerfully with the narrator's current perspective as to be a source of great discomfort to him. At the end of the story the narrator makes a final attempt to come to grips with the significance of this contrast but is able to conclude only that it is impossible to rule out either category of perception.
The two worlds contrast with one another as sharply as they can. One is the world the narrator lives in now, a depressingly monochromatic place of harsh grays and dashed hopes: "Since it was now mid-winter, as we approached home the weather turned bleak again. A cold wind blew noisily into the cabin and, looking out through cracks in the awning, one could see here and there a number of desolate villages splayed out under a sallow sky, quite devoid of life."Z? The other, a world of bright colors and gentle possibilities, is explicitly portrayed as being the one in which the narrator does not live, a world of memory and projected hope: "At this time a marvelous picture suddenly flashed into my mind: a round, golden moon suspended in a deep blue sky and under it the sandy verge of the sea, on which was planted an endless succession of jade-green watermelons. In their midst was a boy of eleven or twelve, wearing a silver ring around his neck and grasping an iron pitchfork in his hands" (477) . The spectral quality of this place is stressed in the "marvelous" (shenyi de) vision that comes into the narrator's mind, putting into question whether it resembles anything that ever existed or could exist.
The narrator is paralyzed in the dismal world in which he is situated. He can take no meaningful action, nor can he communicate with the people of his hometown. It is only in his fantasies of the other world that problems disabling him in his ordinary life become magically solved. In his imagined world, for instance, he overcomes the class barriers that prevent him from communicating with those around him, an isolation that torments him in his ordinary life and a condition he seems powerless to change. The imagined world is conjured up initially by his mother's mention of the name Runtu, a boy who had once spent a New Year's holiday at the narrator's house as an auxiliary servant in a busy season. At the time, thirty years before, Runtu had told Lu Xun (as the narrator is called in the story) stories of his home by the sea that had seemed magical and quite beyond ken to the narrator. The imagined world thus is, in effect, a refuge from hard reality for the morose Lu Xun.
When these two worlds collide, as they do most dramatically when Runtu appears at the narrator's home in "real" time, the hopeful one vanishes without leaving any residue that could be built upon. In contrast to the close relationship with Runtu that exists in his memory, when Runtu actually appears, he creates an unbridgeable distance between himself and the narrator by referring to the latter as "Master" (laoye). For his part, Lu Xun cannot even think of how to begin to talk to Runtu. Only the narrator's mother is able to fashion some means of communication between the two men. The world of memory thus turns out to be utterly illusory. The illusion, far from providing comfort, only serves as an ironic reminder to the narrator of his desperate circumstances and his isolation. He becomes so anxious that when he reenters his imagination toward the end of the story, he confesses, "When I thought of hope, I became afraid." He contrasts his hope with Runtu's belief in idols: "When Runtu had asked for the incense burner and the candlesticks I had secretly laughed at him. I had thought that he had worshipped idols all along and had never been able to put them out of his mind. But now I gained an awareness about my so-called 'hope': was it not also an idol of my own manufacture? The only difference is that his desires are close to hand, while mine are at a vast remove" (485) .
The particulars of the narrator's daily life scheme at all times against his general hope. He finally comes to look on his hope as a sort of addiction that has the power to draw the mind off into solipsistic fantasy from where it is painful to return, the narcotic unreality of the place having such allure. As a result, at story's end, the narrator cannot decide whether the category of hope should exist or not. When he compares it to "roads upon the earth," which do not exist until people actually tramp them out, he would seem to be, however, ruling out the sort of metaphysical hope without certain referent in the world that had constituted his memories of Runtu.
If one construes the narrator's illusory memories in "My Old Home" as emblems of the subjectivity that so obsessed Mao Dun in his critical writings from the early 1920s, one can see in Lu Xun's story a powerful metafiction concerning the representation of the individual imagination in modern Chinese literature. The metafiction is clearly a category that the author of the story considers highly problematic, requiring stringent scrutiny to avoid leading the process of creating fictions away from its self-assigned task of being able to come to grips with the full horror of social reality. As Marston Anderson has pointed out, "For realists, the new fiction could authorize itself only through authors' rigorous moral efforts to purge their consciousness of all modes of self-involvement that might inhibit their capacity for social engagement."28 The problem as Lu Xun presents it in "My Old Home," however, is that it is perceptually and thus intellectually impossible to separate self-involvement from social engagement. For the only thing that moves the story beyond what Mao Dun would have labeled a mere accounting of things observed-a description he used to negatively characterize the traditional novel 29 -is the involvement of an authorial subjectivity inspired by some notion of hope.
In "My Old Home," then, to the extent to which the dream of a new means of representation is just a dream-an individual vision unattached to any practical consequences-it is pure, and dangerous, illusion. Surely the notion that the act of literary representation itself is hedged in all around by dream and delusion is central to this story. The idea of a new literature helping to fabricate a new reality central to Chinese realism thus continually runs aground on the hard facts of Chinese practice. By representing the problem itself, Lu Xun has found rich and moving material. But the space he has created for new literature as a genre in itself is self-canceling. By requiring that hope be something that exists logically only subsequent to praxis-"after many people pass by a road is made" (485)-Lu Xun in effect undercuts any prospect that realist narrative can contribute materially to anything but its sense of its own inadequacy. In "My Old Home," fiction demonstrates itself to be a powerful instrument of representation, but, paradoxically, only if it represents nothing beyond the problems of representation itself.
If Lu Xun's discovery that the individual voice presents a problem that cannot be overcome is deeply embedded in the literary discourse of the years in which he wrote the story, we would not expect to find the issue presented in the same fashion in the 1930s, by which time variously dogmatic theories of the necessity of the objective depiction of reality had dominated literary thought for a number of years. As we have seen, Mao Dun had begun to espouse a theory of the superiority of realism as early as 1922, and his faith in it had only grown stronger by the time he came to write his own narratives. 30 But one can still see embedded in one of the episodes of his 1933 story "Qiu shou" (Autumn harvest) evidence of considerable unease about the possibility of representation. "Autumn Harvest" is the second part of a trilogy Mao Dun wrote about the contemporary Chinese countryside (the first being "Chun can" [Spring silkworms] and the third "Can dong" [Winter ruin]). The overt theme of all three stories is the pernicious effect of market forces, both domestic and international, on the agricultural economy of the quite well developed countryside in the vicinity of Shanghai. The leading figure of "Spring Silkworms" and "Autumn Harvest," the old peasant Tongbao, had been a successful farmer in the days before the internationalization of the agricultural market, but he shows himself in these stories to be no longer capable of dealing with a new world where the market functions under different rules.
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The focal point of "Autumn Harvest," the longest of the stories, is a drought that almost wipes out the summer rice crop in the district where Tongbao and his family live. The crops are saved only through the intervention of a new mechanical pump run from a steam launch anchored in the canal beside the farm. The steam launch, as Tongbao is bitterly aware, represents the influx of Western technology, something profoundly alien to the old man that embodies for him all the changes that have disabled his old familiarity with the world. Tongbao can only imagine the water hoisted onto his field as the saliva of the mud-fish spirit that the (to us) mythic animal will soon return for. The use of saliva here is similar to the depiction of moonlight in Lu Xun's "Diary of a Madman." It is indisputably wet (as moonlight is assuredly not dark), but with a spectral wetness that lacks water's virtues in slaking the thirst either of animal or plant. Tongbao, in other words, fears that the water pumped in by Western technology is merely represented and that since it comes from nothing, it can just as easily return there.
The links in these stories between new and spectral objects of representation and the new economic system brought by the West are always situated in the high foreground. The cost of new equipment purchased in the hope of what invariably turns out to be an imaginary return embodies the harsh economic counterpart to the anxiety concerning the potential of representation. Tongbao, initially reluctant to invest money in ventures based on speculation, is always eventually seduced into participation in such ventures by the promise of extravagant returns. Each time, however, some market force intervenes to dash his hopes and to cost him not only his speculative investment, but a portion of his initial capital as well. The irrigation episode provides a case in point. Initially aghast that pumped-in water will cost eight dollars (eight dollars more, in other words, than it had ever cost before), Tongbao quickly shifts his focus to the returns the harvested rice will bring. Should prices even be close to those of the year before, Tongbao will realize a vast return on his eight-dollar investment. But the rice crop that year turns out to be universally bountiful, and the low prices that ensue ruin the family and cause the old man to have a fatal stroke.
I consider this image a central one for May Fourth's aspirations for literary representation, providing the perfect metaphor for the literary dynamic of those years. The trope perfectly embodies the peculiar mix of utopian fantasies alternating with terror that the whole enterprise is fundamentally without value, that everything imagined in this way not only can never come to fruition but will incur crushing unexpected costs as well. Realism, the idea that something virtually tangible can be generated out of nothing, appears itself as part of this trope. It presents itself in the form of a huge gamble that must be taken in defiance of local conditions that inexplicably but persistentlymanage only to lengthen the odds against eventual success.
This construction of realism offers as payment a vision based on all-or-nothing speculation at a much higher price than any of the traditional genres of Chinese literature had ever demanded. Foreign technology, as the midwife for this fantasy in "Autumn Harvest," is a trope even more fraught with significance. It indicates the extent to which the post-May Fourth notion of literary representationalism could not exist without foreign intervention even as it points to the extent to which its very foreignness renders the whole enterprise doubly uncertain and doubly "marvelous." The resolve of modern Chinese literature to mask its suspicions concerning the foreign ori-gins of realism behind a determined perception of realism as a natural force becomes understandable in this light. Admitting the foreign and discursive origins of the literary dispensation introduced during May Fourth is to openly accept the speculative status of something that it was hoped could stand as the foundation of a new intellectual order. Not admitting it, however, causes the repressed to exhibit its propensity to eternally return.
It would be possible to trace the force of this trope of anxiety concerning the possibility of representation through at least those metafictions that reflect on the condition of modern Chinese literature. But it is in the convulsive status of realism as a critical category where the traces can be discerned most clearly. Yu-shih Chen's brilliant exegesis of Mao Dun's early fiction makes clear the extent to which the theory of "representation" breaks down under critical analysis.
32 When this powerful exegesis is forced to make a choice between reading Mao Dun's texts as explorations of new imaginative worlds or as tabulations of Party history, Chen opts for the latter. l'his interpretation of Mao Dun's fictions as allegories of the real world rather than as works trying to flesh out the uncertain domains of realism limned in the May Fourth period points out the extent to which guilt over the suspect origins of realism seems to get the upper hand. If representationalism can crumble in the hands of such an astute critic as Chen, it is understandable that it has failed to survive the ministrations of those critics determined to reinscribe it within a state discourse that seeks only the blandest recapitulation of "things as they are." Notes brilliantly explores the domestic political consequences of certain discursive assumptions about China's place in the world. As the work on this topic now being produced is very much in the formative stages, however, it is difficult at this time to gain a good sense of its import and direction. As of the initial writing of this article (1990) , the scholarship on modern Chinese literature in the United States has been remarkably slow and reluctant to engage the "postcolonial" discourse that has reshaped so much of contemporary criticism.
4. See Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), especially chapter 1, "The Problem with 'China's Response to the West.' " 5. The "Postmodernism and Japan" symposium originally published in The South Atlantic Quarterly 87:3 (Summer 1988) represents a milestone in this development in Japanese studies.
6. Max Weber perfectly captures the subtly nuanced peremptory tone of the Western discourse on universality in the first words of his introduction to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: "A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value" (trans. Talcott Parsons [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958], p. 13).
The parenthetical "as we like to think" gives this statement its real universalizing force, admitting a relativism that establishes within Western thought a capacity for self-reflection that is a signifier of its power and limitless scope.
7. Lin Yii-sheng in his important book The Crisis of Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979) gives due stress to the ways in which the radicals of the May Fourth period conceived of the past as a monolithic barrier to progress. His phrase "totalistic iconoclasm" perfectly captures this May Fourth disposition.
8. Although aware of the contradictory nature of the two discourses of particularism and universalism, Levenson seems to have more or less systematically avoided the full implications of that contradiction. See, for instance, his Revolution and Cosmopolitanism: The Western Stage and the Chinese Stages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 30: "For China to be both culturally cut down and politically cut up was too crushing to contenlplate. And the second of these conditions promised to perpetuate the first." However, he failed to recognize the full opacity of the cultural defense mechanisms that grew out of the first of his two insights. Levenson's failure to deal with the extent to which discourses out of the past still pressed
